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Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to
Fire Wrongful Discharge Law
Andrew P. Morriss*
If I can fire someone for making shitty ice cream, then I can fire
them for being a shitty person.
Jerry Greenfield, Ben and Jerry's Homemade, Inc.'
I. Introduction
Ever since Professor Lawrence Blades's groundbreaking critique of the
employment-at-will rule in 1967,2 courts and legal commentators have
decried the at-will rule as having an "unsound foundation"3 and as "a
harsh outgrowth of the notion of reciprocal rights." 4 This unremitting
stream of hostile commentary has had an important impact-court after
court has accepted the challenge to severely limit this longstanding rule.'
Based on the assumption that the absence of the state from the decision-
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Economics, Case Western Reserve
University. A.B. 1981, Princeton University; J.D. 1984, M.Pub.Aff. 1984, The University of Texas
at Austin; Ph.D. (Economics) 1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Comments from partici-
pants at seminars at the Institute for Humane Studies and Case Western Reserve Law School improved
early drafts. Additional comments from Carol Akers, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Jonathan Entin, Robert
Gibbons, Michael Piore, James Rebitzer, Robert Strassfeld, and Symposium participants caught many
errors. Alice Hunt cheerfully produced multiple versions. All additional errors are my own.
1. Robert E. Sullivan, Jr., Just Desserts, ROLLING STONE, July 9, 1992, at 79.
2. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967).
3. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985). For an institu-
tional view of the origins of the rle, see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994).
4. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1Il. 1981).
5. Even a quick survey of the employment law of the 1980s reveals that "[c]ourts across the
country are conducting a frontal assault on this time-honored doctrine [employment-at-will] and in many
states, judicially and legislatively created exceptions are eroding it." Nina G. Stillman, Workplace
Claims: WrongfulDischarge, Public Policy Actions, and Other CommonLaw Torts, in 2 19TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 57 (1990). Only Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island have clearly
failed to adopt even one exception to the at-will rule. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Indiv. Empl.
Rts. Man.) 505:51-52 (1994). Depending on how one interprets its caselaw, Georgia may also have
failed to adopt an exception. See Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Frameworkfor Empirical Research
on the Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-At-Will, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 999, 1058 (1995).
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making process implies that the parties' decisions are unconstrained, the
critics and courts have painted a picture of Dickensian scope. Arbitrary
firings of deserving individuals abound; only the state can deliver these
helpless victims from the clutches of their capitalist masters. This picture
is, of course, nonsense.
The employment-at-will rule is not a nineteenth-century method of
oppressing employees.6 It is an allocation of decisionmaking authority
between the public and private sectors which serves the needs of both
employers and employees. The rule enables employers and employees to
contract, to their mutual benefit, for a higher level of performance than the
alternative "reforms" proposed by various commentators and adopted by
courts. Indeed, nineteenth-century trade unions in Britain actively
bargained for an equivalent contractual rule, the "minute contract," which
lasted a minute and automatically renewed itself, to avoid a system of
criminal penalties for employees who breached employment contracts by
quitting.7 To an inmate of a British jail serving six months hard labor for
daring to leave his employer before the expiration of his contract, the
employment-at-will rule would have been a significant improvement.
Perhaps most importantly, the default nature of the at-will rule allows
the heterogeneous class of employees to choose among a diverse set of job
6. Avoiding the legal literature's excessive concentration on possibly deserving individuals' cases
does not deny that employers sometimes fire employees for irrational or even immoral reasons. See
Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481,481-82 (1976) [hereinafter Summers, IndividualProtection]; Clyde W. Summers, Protecting
All Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 132. No legal system
has yet been devised, however, which can always costlessly prevent such action. This focus on indivi-
dual cases at the expense of the general is epitomized by Theodore St. Antoine's statement, commenting
on Richard Epstein's arguments in favor of the at-will rule, that "[e]ven if Epstein is right in everything
he has to say about employees collectively, it is this piercing hurt to individuals which justifies the call
for reform of the at-will doctrine." Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988). Of course, if Epstein is correct
about the value of the at-will rule for employees in general, a change would produce an enormous
welfare loss for the majority of employees. Justifying such an imposition would require an extra-
ordinarily "piercing" loss for discharged individuals, who by any count number far fewer than those
who are not discharged, to meet any basic notion of fairness.
7. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States
and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 98-99 (1982). The dominant feature of
employment law in Britain between 1823 and 1875 was the extensive involvement of the state in en-
forcing employment contracts. The state gave employment contracts special treatment under several
statutes. The most important of these statutes was 4 Geo. 4, 34, passed in 1823 (and extended to addi-
tional employees by 10 Geo. 4, 23). Morriss, supra note 3, at 760-61. Three important features of
this statute were unique to Britain: (1) criminal enforcement of employment contracts was available
against employees but not employers; (2) enforcement was through summary procedures conducted by
local magistrates without juries; and (3) appeals were both formally limited and generally recognized
as futile. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, American Exceptionalism Revisited: State Oppression and
Nineteenth Century British Employment Law (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas
Law Review). More than 100,000 employees were convicted of violating the Master and Servant Acts
between 1860 and 1875, the only years for which there are data. JUDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND
WALES (1860-75).
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characteristics when making employment decisions. Mandating that all
employees receive the same level of legal job security will lead to transfers
of utility between groups of employees. Such within-class transfers remove
the issue from the category of simple redistribution from the haves to the
have-nots.
The at-will rule also suits the institutional competence of courts. A
critical difference between at-will and just-cause rules is where the final
decision on firing is located. Under the at-will rule an insider (the firm)
has complete discretion; under a just-cause rule an outsider (a court) has
the final say. The at-will rule is also simple: an employer can fire an
employee at any time for any reason and an employee may quit at any time
for any reason.' Just-cause rules are complex: an employer can fire an
employee without liability only if he can convince an unknown set of
decisionmakers that the discharge was justified based on an unknown
information set. The question of reform is thus one of weighing the costs
of different institutional structures with the benefits they produce. This is
a question courts are ill suited to answer.
Reliance on the courts and governmental agencies as mechanisms to
implement a politically defined structure characterized much of the post-
Depression period not just in employer-employee relations,9 but in other
areas as well. The structural details have changed over time, reflecting the
gradual increase in the role of the state in the national economy and other
aspects of life, but the general thrust has remained the same: "outside"
decisionmakers, usually courts and administrative agencies, enforce a wide
variety of command regulations."0
8. Simplicity has enormous value itself. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 30 (1995) (observing that "simplicity... reduces the costs necessary to achieve any
agreed-upon end"); Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits
to Demand, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 233, 235 (1984) (asserting that simple arrangements dealing with wage
rates "are in widespread use because they perform better in many respects than more complicated
contracts").
9. While many aspects of the employer-employee relationship were left to collective bargaining,
that bargaining process took place within a structure defined by the state. See National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1994)). The state
set the rules for certification elections, defined the economic weapons available to the parties (by
prohibiting secondary boycotts and common-situs picketing and allowing permanent replacement of
striking workers), and set the goals (by defining mandatory subjects of bargaining and requiring
recognition of unions). See id. To the extent that employees are blocked from forming or joining
unions by state action, it hardly seems appropriate to turn to another branch of the state to create a new
right instead of removing the legal barriers to collective action. If some employees have chosen not
to join unions for other reasons, mandating just-cause rules is not likely to increase those employees'
welfare, let alone social welfare.
10. One prominent exception to this trend is the deference that the courts have shown to grievance-
arbitration agreements. A dominant theme of the Steelworkers trilogy, for example, is the inferiority
of a court's ability to decide industrial disputes, including those over discharges, compared to the ability
of an arbitrator to resolve such conflicts. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
1996] 1903
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This broad consensus that state meddling in previously private bar-
gains was both beneficial and appropriate mirrored the post-Depression
Keynesian consensus in economic thought." Both the Keynesian consen-
sus on the ability of government to intervene in the economy and the pol-
itical consensus on the capability of government decisionmakers (happily)
have now disappeared. An extensive public choice literature on govern-
mental failures has joined the market failure literature. The disappearance
of this consensus ought to inspire us to rethink all interventions into private
bargains: If the emperor has no clothes, his judges' robes may be equally
threadbare.
One of the many effects of the combination of technological change,
globalization of labor, capital, and product markets, and changes in labor
force composition in recent years is the disruption of traditional employ-
ment patterns based on Fordist production techniques. Of all the branches
of government, the judiciary is the least capable of responding to these
massive economic and social changes in a productive manner. It has the
least capacity for collecting and analyzing data, the least ability to control
its own agenda, and the least democratic accountability.
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of economic
insecurity faced by many employees worldwide. They range from tradi-
tional unions to forms of employee-employer cooperation which do not fit
within the confines of the National Labor Relations Act. None of these
solutions is likely to be adequate, not to mention ideal, for all employers
and all employees. The massive scale of the societal changes at the root
of our current economic instability argue against the one-size-fits-all
responses offered by the legal system. Employers and employees must be
freed from outside interference to develop solutions appropriate to the
many forms of industrial organization which coexist in the economy. Of
course, freedom has its price. Not every employee will be "protected" and
some employers will undoubtedly do bad things. Protecting all employees
without imposing significant costs on other employees and society in
general, however, is simply not an option.
U.S. 564, 568 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584-85 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960).
11. There was, of course, disagreement over the particular goals-reducing inflation or raising
employment-or the methods-monetary or fiscal policy-but a consensus existed that government
could improve the market outcomes with the appropriate policy instruments. See Mark Kelman, Could
Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations onLaw and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1215, 1235-37
(1993) (observing that although Keynesians disagreed about the appropriate instrument, they all agreed
that the government needed to intervene actively in the economy).
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II. Overestimating the Problem
The critics of the at-will rule argue that the wrongful discharge of at-
will employees is a major problem for the U.S. economy. 2 Unjustified
discharges and general abuse of at-will employees abound, they argue, so
something must be done. To support the claim of widespread abuse, critics
rely on articles by Professor Cornelius Peck 3 and Professors Jack Stieber
and Michael Murray, 4 and horror stories drawn from judicial opinions.
When courts have bothered to consider the scope of the "problem" of
unjust discharge, Peck's and Stieber and Murray's estimates have found
their way into court decisions. 5 Like other aspects of the critics' case
against the at-will rule, these estimates are based on untenable assumptions.
Data on unemployment show that other causes of job loss overwhelm job
losses from "wrongful discharges." Data from quality-of-employment
surveys suggest that reliance on court opinions produces overestimates of
the incidence of employer abuses of employees. Consideration of these
data suggests that the focus of concern for employees should be new job
creation and improved economic conditions to preserve existing jobs-a
prescription that is unlikely to include new state mandates for employers.
A. Estimates of At-Will Discharges
Professor Cornelius Peck was the first to tackle the question of how
many at-will employees are actually discharged. Peck calculated that "the
number of discharge and discipline cases in the nonunionized sector that
would have been subjected to [arbitration] in a collective bargaining
12. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 2, at 1404 ("It is a widely accepted proposition that large corpo-
rations now pose a threat to individual freedom comparable to that which would be posed if govern-
mental power were unchecked." (footnotes omitted)); Committee on Labor and Employment Law, At-
WillEmployment and The Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 170, 170 (1981)
("At present, approximately seventy percent of all employees in the private sector in this country...
have virtually no protection against unjust dismissal."); Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs
on the 7itanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1616,
1617 (1995) ("It is time to acknowledge that U.S. workers have minimal employment dignity and al-
most no job security."); Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 6, at 483 ("[L]ess than a third of
our employed work force presently enjoys [just cause] protection; more than two-thirds still have no
recourse except to the courts, where 'the law has taken for granted' that an employee can be terminated
'for any or no reason.'" (footnote omitted)) (quoting Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174,
176 (Pa. 1974)).
13. Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979).
14. Jack Stieber &Michael Murray, Protection Against UnjustDischarge: The Need ForA Federal
Statute, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983).
15. E.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 470 (Md. 1981) (citing Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816 n.2 (1980) (citing Peck, supra note 13, at 8-10)).
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relationship could be as high as 300,000 a year."' 6
which uses 1976 data,' 7 is presented in Figure 1.18
Peck's calculation,
total nonagricultural work force





less 90% of federal civilian employees
less 50% of state and local employees
at-will employees
nonunion sector discharge and discipline cases that
would have been subject to arbitration in union sector
number that would have been overturned 150,000
-2,591,100
- 6,084,500
Figure 1: Peck's Calculation of At-Will Employees
50,324,400
300,000
16. Peck, supra note 13, at 10. A student note uses a similar methodology. See Note, supra note
15, at 1816 n.2.
17. Peck, supra note 13, at 8 n.39 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 387 (98th ed. 1977) (Table 625: Labor Force and
Employment: 1947 to 1977)).
18. To calculate discharge rates, Peck used arbitration data from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) and American Arbitration Association (AAA). Estimating that arbitrators
from the FMCS and AAA combined decided approximately 3,500 discharge and discipline cases annu-
ally, Peck then doubled that estimate to account for arbitrations unaffiliated with either the FCMS or
AAA. This produced an estimate of the total number of cases heard by all arbitrators of "around 7,000
cases of discharge or discipline of employees that labor union officers believe to be unjustifiable and
hence worthy of arbitration." Id. at 9. Since management is reversed in slightly more than half such
cases, and assuming that management makes discharge decisions more carefully when they know arbi-
tration is a possibility, Peck then concluded that "at least 12,000 to 15,000 employees are discharged
or disciplined each year under circumstances that would have led to arbitration if they had been
working under a collective bargaining agreement and represented by a union. At least half of the dis-
charges would have been found to be unjustifiable." Id. at 9-10. Factoring in estimates of the number
of cases settled, without specifying the basis for the estimates, Peck concluded that "the number of dis-
charge and discipline cases in the nonunionized sector that would have been subjected to that process
[arbitration] in a collective bargaining relationship could be as high as 300,000 a year." Id. at 10.
This produces an implicit rate of unjust discharge of approximately 0.6% (based on 300,000 unjust dis-
charges resulting from an at-will workforce of approximately 50 million).
1906 [Vol. 74:1901
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A few years later, Professors Jack Stieber and Michael Murray made a
similar calculation with 1981 data and concluded that "some 140,000 dis-
charged nonunionized workers with more than six months service would
have been reinstated to their jobs with full, partial, or no back pay."19
Their calculation is presented in Figure 2.21
nonagricultural employees on private payrolls 75,000,000
less employees represented by unions -16,000,000
less at-will employees with < 6 mos. tenure -12,000,000
total at-will employees with tenure __ 6 mos. 47,000,000
x 3 % discharge rate x 3%
1,410,000
x 20% grievance filing rate x 20%
282,000
x 50% employee success rate X 50%
total employees with tenure > 6 mos. who would 141,000
have been discharged, filed a claim, and won
Figure 2: Stieber and Murray's Calculation of At-Will Employees
19. Stieber & Murray, supra note 14, at 324.
20. Like Peck, Stieber and Murray began with a residual workforce calculation, although they re-
moved an estimated number of probationary employees and all government employees. Id. at 323.
Based on unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data on discharge rates between 1959 and 1971 and
a Michigan survey of employers, they assumed a 4% discharge rate for this residual workforce. Id.
at 324. Because employees in the first six months of employment are generally subject to a probation-
ary period under both collective bargaining agreements and most modifications of the at-will rule, they
arbitrarily reduced the rate to 3 %. Id. These calculations produced the estimate of 1.4 million nonpro-
bationary employees discharged in 1981. Id. Finally, Stieber and Murray assumed, based on union-
sector arbitration experience, that 80% of employees with potential claims will not bring a case and that
only half of those who do will win. This provided the conclusion that 140,000 at-will employees are
discharged who would have had claims under a just-cause standard and who would have both brought
a claim and won if offered an arbitration-like remedy. Id.
1996] 1907
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The two calculations use similar, quite inventive methodologies. In
each, estimates of employees with non-at-will contracts are subtracted from
an overall estimate of the workforce. This residual is then adjusted by
various assumed factors to calculate the number discharged who would be
successful if given a remedy for wrongful discharge. Both calculations can
be brought up to date with more recent data. Table 1 shows that Peck's
and Steiber and Murray's methods produce sharply higher estimates of the
number of at-will employees, and hence discharges, with more recent
data.2 '
21. Not all the information in Table I is presented in Peck and Stieber & Murray. The following
calculations and data sources were used: (1) Nonagricultural workforce: Peck, supra note 13, at 8
(estimating that there were 80 million nonagricultural workers in the United States in 1976); Stieber
& Murray, supra note 14, at 322 (estimating that there were 75 million nonagricultural workers on
private payrolls in 1981); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 395 (114th ed. 1994) (Table 614: Employment Status of the
Population: 1950 to 1993) [hereinafter 1994 STATISTICAL ABSrRACT] (calculating that the 1993
agricultural workforce consisted of 116,232,000 workers). (2) Covered by union contract: Peck, supra
note 13, at 8 (stating that only 21 million persons were members of unions in 1976); Stieber & Murray,
supra note 14, at 322 (stating that there were fewer than 16 million workers represented by labor
organizations in 1981); 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 439 (Table 683: Union Members, by
Selected Characteristics: 1983 and 1993) (estiniating that 12.3% of nonagricultural workers were
represented by unions in 1993). (3) Excluded government employees: Peck, supra note 13, at 8-9
(explaining that more thanhalf of state employees and over 90% of federal employees enjoy procedural
safeguards); Stieber & Murray, supra note 14, at 322 (excluding all government employees from
calculations because they are protected from unjust discharge by collective bargaining or civil service
procedures); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNTED STATES 424 (103d ed. 1982-83) (Table 661: Nonagricultural Industries-Number of
Employees, 1970 to 1981, and Number and Earnings of Production Workers, 1975 to 1981)
(calculating that there were 16,024,000 government employees in 1981); 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra, at 424 (Table 656: Nonfarm Industries-Employees and Earnings: 1980 to 1993) (calculating
that there were 18,842,000 government employees in 1993). (4) At-will employees, calculated by
subtracting (2) and (3) from (1): Stieber & Murray, supra note 14, at 323 (assuming that 20% of all
nonunionized workers in the private sector would be excluded from protection for unjust discharge due
to falling within the six-month probationary period). (5) Estimated discharges of at-will employees:
Peck, supra note 13, at 10 (suggesting that "if negotiation of discharge and discipline grievances
produces settlements at a rate comparable to that experienced in other dispute settlement negotiations,
the number of discharge and discipline cases in the nonunionized sector that would have been subjected
to that process in a collective bargaining relationship could be as high as 300,000 a year"); Stieber &
Murray, supra note 14, at 324 (calculating that the discharge rate for employees who have completed
their six-month probationary period would be about 3.0%, and multiplying that percentage by the
number of nonprobationary, at-will employees for both 1981 and 1993 to produce discharge estimates
of 1,770,000 and 1,994,000 respectively). (6) Estimated unjust discharges of at-will employees: Peck,
supra note 13, at 10 (suggesting that at least half of the discharges that would have led to arbitration
had the workers been under a collective bargaining agreement would have been found unjustified).
1908
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Table 1: Comparison and Update of At-Will Estimates
1909
Peck (in thousands) Stieber & Murray
(in thousands)
1976 1993 1981 1993
data data data data
Nonagricultural 80,000 116,232 91,024 116,232
workforce
Covered by union 21,000 14,296 16,000 14,296
contract
Excluded government 8,676 10,586 16,024 18,842
employees
At-will employees with
< 6 mos. tenure - - 12,000 16,619
excluded
At-will employees who 50,324 91,350 47,000 66,475
would receive protection 50,324 91,350 47,000 66,475
Percent of non-
agricultural workforce 63% 79% 65% 72%
with at-will contracts
Estimated discharges of
at-will employees 300 548 1,400 1,994
Estimated unjust
discharges of at-will 150 274 700 997
employees I
Sources: Stieber & Murray, supm note 15, and Peck, supra note 14 (for
textual explanation of this table, see note 21).
Despite these inventive methods employed in estimating something on
which no reliable direct data exists, both sets of calculations are
problematic. The calculations can provide at most an upper bound on the
number of discharges because both calculate the number of at-will
employees as a residual by subtracting other groups from the total labor
force. '  Because fixed-term contracts do exist, even if in unknown
quantity, this result provides an upper bound rather than an estimate of the
22. This is unavoidable because there are no data on the terms of employment agreements.
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number of at-will employees. So long as the result is treated as an upper
bound, this problem is not fatal.
The most serious problem is the use of union arbitration discharge
rates for calculations concerning the nonunion sector.' Both Peck and
Stieber and Murray assume a fifty-percent win rate for at-will employees
based upon union-sector arbitration experience.24 This assumption is not
supportable. Under most collective bargaining agreements, the union, not
the employee, has the right to take a discharge to arbitration.' The union
win rate is likely to be influenced by the union's screening of the claims
it brings to arbitration. Similarly, union and nonunion employers might
23. Peck uses union arbitration data and an unsupported assumption concerning settlement rates
to conclude that there are 12,000 to 15,000 employees "discharged or disciplined each year under cir-
cumstances that would have led to arbitration if they had been working under a collective bargaining
agreement and represented by a union." Peck, supra note 13, at 10. He then derives the figure of
300,000 discharge and discipline cases by assuming that "negotiation of discharge and discipline
grievances produces settlements at a rate comparable to that experienced in other dispute settlement
negotiations .... " Id. This implies that 95% of disputes settle. Although Peck does not describe
his calculation of discharge rates, it appears his figures come from doubling the number of reported
arbitration cases concerning discharge and discipline and assuming a proportionate number of dis-
charges for employees in the nonunion sector, an implied discharge rate of 0.6%, far lower than the
3% to 4% rate that Stieber and Murray's research indicates. See supra note 20. Stieber and Murray
base their discharge rates on a separate empirical study, but also adopt employee win rates from the
union sector experience with arbitration.
In addition, Peck combines discharge and discipline grievance cases. Peck, supra note 13, at
8-10. Discipline and discharge are quite different things, and Peck provides no numbers on how the
cases break down. The decision whether to take a grievance over discipline to arbitration differs from
the decision to take a discharge to arbitration in at least one important respect: discharge imposes a
sufficiently high cost on the discharged employee so that the benefit to the employee (although not
necessarily to the union) of arbitration is almost certain to outweigh the costs, yet the cost to the
employee of discipline varies widely with the specific sanction. Peck also assumes that the same
proportion of cases submitted to AAA, FMCS, and unaffiliated arbitration panels are settled and in-
volve discharge and discipline. Id. at 9. Given the many differences between arbitrations conducted
by these different types of arbitrators, the FCMS's and AAA's rules governing arbitrators' conduct dif-
fer in some respects. The lists of arbitrators used by the two services are not identical. The AAA
charges a docketing fee, while the FMCS does not, reducing the cost of filing an FMCS arbitration.
The FMCS has a higher prehearing settlement rate, which is at least partially attributable to this dif-
ference. Interview with Elvis Stephens, Arbitrator, University of North Texas, in Denton, Tex. (Nov.
6, 1991). Even greater differences exist with respect to unaffiliated arbitrators. The parties will choose
between the sources of arbitrators based on the characteristics of the underlying agreement, introducing
selection bias. The rates of particular types of disputes will not, therefore, necessarily be the same.
24. Peck, supra note 13, at 9; Stieber & Murray, supra note 14, at 324.
25. It is axiomatic that the union exercises that right in pursuit of the maximum benefit to the
union, rather than to the individual. This casts no aspersion on the motive of the union. A favorable
view of a union's motives might mean that the union is seeking to maximize the benefit to all its mem-
bers by conserving scarce resources in frivolous cases, while a less favorable view of union motives
might see the decision as one used by the union leadership to keep loyal members in theirjobs and let-
ting disloyal ones lose theirs. Unions bring discharge grievances not because the union officers believe
the discharge is "unjustifiable" but because it serves the unions' purposes to do so. Further, unions'
decisions are complicated by the duty of fair representation imposed upon them by federal law.
Finally, arbitration costs in the union sector are borne by the union, not the discharged employee, as
they would be in the nonunion sector.
1910
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make the decision to discharge differently.' Employees might also
behave differently in the union sector.Y Whatever the motives of either
side, it is clear that there is no reason to expect the employee win rate for
discharge claims to be the same for nonunion employees as for union
employees.
Another reason to be suspicious of the applicability of the union-sector
win rate to the nonunion-sector rate is the difference in the types of jobs
in each sector. Unionization rates vary by industry, ranging from 30.5 %
in transportation and public utilities to 1.9 % in finance, insurance, and real
estate.28 To the extent that dispute, win, and unionization rates vary by
industry, estimates based on union-sector job distributions will be incorrect.
Since we know that "large, systematic wage differences exist among
industries even for workers who have similar observed characteristics and
work in the same well-defined job classification in the same locality,"29
there is every reason to expect dispute and win rates to differ across indus-
tries.3" Finally, in other work, Stieber identified significant differences
26. Peck asserts that unionized employers discharge more carefully since they are aware of the
arbitrator looking over their shoulder. Peck, supra note 13, at 9-10. It might be, however, that
unionized employers view arbitration strategically. For example, they might see it as expanding the
range of employee penalties. An employer might discharge a valuable but recalcitrant employee with
the expectation of an eventual reinstatement, to give him a scare. Alternatively, the employer might
see the arbitrator's decision as a means to overturn a supervisor's firing decision without requiring the
employer to contradict the supervisor, preserving what could be an important aspect of the employer-
supervisor relationship. The parties might also seek to arbitrate claims an outsider would consider
meritless. As Justice Douglas noted in the Steelworkers' trilogy, "The processing of even frivolous
claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment may
be quite unaware." United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(footnote omitted); see also Archibald Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 247, 261 (1958) (presenting the benefits of arbitration clauses that cover all
collective bargaining disputes without regard to merit); Denise R. Chachere & Peter Feulle, Grievance
Procedures and Due Process in Nonunion Workplaces, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFrH ANNUAL MEETING 446, 447 (John F.
Burton, Jr. ed., 1993) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (explaining that grievance procedures in union firms
"serve as remedial voice mechanisms").
27. Knowing that they have the union to back them up and that an arbitrator will review their case,
they may be emboldened to push a dispute to the point where it reaches a discharge, rather than accept
a lesser disciplinary measure. For example, if a company changes a work rule in the union sector, this
may lead to a dispute over whether bargaining is required, and some employees who hew to the union
position may be disciplined while that dispute is being resolved. Such disputes obviously cannot arise
without a collective bargaining agreement.
The union context also provides additional reasons for disputes: employees may be engaged in
disputes over working conditions with employers which lead both employees and employers to fight
issues which would not be present in the nonunion sector.
28. 1994 STATISrICAL ABSrRACr 439 (Table 683: Union Members, by Selected Characteristics:
1983 and 1993). An even higher percentage of the government sector is unionized (37.7%). Id.
29. Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrivriV: MICROECONOMICS 209,216 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford
Winston eds., 1989).
30. To the extent that the wage differences reflect labor rents rather than differences in labor
quality, they create important differences in incentives for both employers and employees. For
Texas Law Review
in arbitration outcomes based on the arbitrator used and the reason for the
discharge." Unless the reasons for discharge are similarly distributed in
the union and nonunion sector3" and the pool of arbitrators used is simi-
lar, the union sector is an unreliable guide.
Four factors suggest that, aside from the methodological problems in
their calculations, Peck's and Stieber and Murray's estimates grossly over-
estimate the scope of the problem of "unjust discharges." First, even at-
will firms operate within the general framework of federal, state, and local
antidiscrimination laws.3 Employers have responded to civil rights laws
by, among other things, adopting personnel policies and practices that
reduce the risk of arbitrary behavior by bureaucratizing employment
decisions. These procedures are likely to protect employees against
arbitrary discharges in general for the simple reason that maintaining two
sets of personnel practices to prevent prohibited discrimination while
allowing other arbitrary actions would be expensive, breed resentment, and
produce no discernible benefits.
Second, union-sector employees frequently win arbitrations based on
factors which are not applicable to nonunion firms." For example,
employees in union-sector firms often argue in arbitration cases that they
have been treated differently than other employees." There is no reason
to think, however, that comparable treatment will be an equally important
part of just-cause litigationY.
3
example, if employers are paying wages above market rates, they have an incentive to discharge less
productive employees. The presence of significant labor rents would also motivate discharged
employees to pursue remedies more aggressively than those employees would in the absence of such
rents. These differences are likely to affect the character of discharge disputes.
31. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration
Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 543, 548-52 (1987).
32. Because of the lack of union influence on work roles in the nonunion sector, these reasons are
unlikely to be similar.
33. These laws are increasingly used in discharge cases. See John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983,
1015-17 (1991) (describing a shift in the nature of employment discrimination litigation from
predominantly hiring charges to termination charges).
34. Thomas A. Kochan & Peter Cappelli, The Transformation of the Industrial Relations and
Personnel Function, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 133, 146-48 (Paul Osterman ed., 1984).
35. There is also some evidence that even within union-sector firms, employees who are members
of the union file grievances at a greater rate than nonmembers do. Karen E. Boroff, The Probability
of Filing A Grievance-Does Union Membership Make a Difference?, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 26,
at 251,'256-57. This suggests that the filing rates may be lower in nonunion work situations.
36. FRANK ELKoURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 684-87 (4th ed. 1985)
("[A]li employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same
unless a reasonable basis exists for variations in the assessment of punishment.").
37. The small businesses and white-collar employees who will now be covered present smaller
groups of comparable employees, among whom disparate treatment claims will be harder to frame
because the sample size is smaller even if unfair treatment is more noticeable.
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Third, consider Richard Epstein's argument that "unjust discharges"
are reduced over time because employees and employers each become
more valuable to the other as time passes. Not only are replacement costs
high, but both have built up relationship-specific capital which ending the
relationship would eliminate.3" Although one may disagree with Epstein
about how strong this effect will be, and most critics of the at-will rule
disagree quite vehemently with him, the effect must exist to some degree.
At-will employers' behavior at the margin, wherever that is, is clearly
constrained by the ability of at-will employees to quit.39
Fourth, attempting to estimate the significance of the at-will rule by
focusing on terminations rather than on individuals is likely to produce
overestimates. The typical job in the United States is extremely brief, but
most employees hold stable jobs lasting years." A rule that works well
for the vast majority of employees could thus appear to cause many
problems if the focus is on terminations.
Perhaps the most important reason why these estimates are unreliable
is the fundamental difference between the union sector and the nonunion
sector in the content of jobs. To the extent that union-sector job disputes
are about disagreements about verifiable information,41 the experience
with those disputes will not provide any information about how courts (or
any other dispute resolution mechanism) will resolve disputes that are based
on disagreements over observable but not verifiable information.42
The extent of the problem of unjustified discharges is simply
unknowable given the data available. 3 If these estimates are the best that
can be done, can these calculations provide at least a rough guide for
policymakers? No. The fundamental flaw in the methodologies, the use
of union arbitration data to estimate the effect on nonunion firms, obscures
any potential benefit from even a rough calculation. The union and
nonunion sectors are so different that it is simply impossible to apply
information accurately based on one to the other.
38. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 974-75
(1984).
39. Union-sector firms are subject to the same pressure, of course, but given the substantial wage
premium associated with union-sector jobs, employees will be less willing to quit. The premium is
estimated to be as high as 14%. See H. GREGGS LEWIs, UNION RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A SURVEY
174-87 (1986).
40. Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. ECON. REV.
716, 720-22 (1982).
41. Union sector disputes are more likely to tum on disagreements about verifiable information
because of the work rules necessary for protection of the union.
42. I thank Professor J. Hoult Verkerke for suggesting this point to me in discussions during this
Symposium.
43. Professor Verkerke suggested at the Symposium that "it generally takes an estimate to beat
an estimate." I would agree that it takes a theory to beat a theory but not that it takes an estimate to
beat an estimate. Seriously flawed estimates require only the identification of the flaws, not substitute
national surveys, to call their validity into question.
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Moreover, attempting to calculate the number of "wrongful
discharges" from scratch ignores the data we have on unemployment. By
examining the data we can gain some perspective on the estimates of at-will
discharges. Table 2 shows data on causes of unemployment for the years
for which Peck's and Stieber and Murray's calculations are reported in
Table 1. Even if we were to accept the studies' estimates as roughly
correct,' their size relative to the job losses caused by layoffs and the
number of new entrants and re-entrants unable to obtain work suggest that
public policy would be better focused on removing obstacles to economic
growth.4"
Table 2: Unemployment by Reason
Year Reason for unemployment (in thousands)
JobNe
Job losers Re-entrants Newleavers entrants
Total Layoff Other
1976 3,679 1,050 2,628 903 1,928 895
1981 4,267 1,430 2,837 923 2,102 981
1993 4,769 1,104 3,664 946 2,145 874
Source: ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 326 (1996) (Table B-40:
Unemployment by Duration and Reason 1950-95) (figures rounded).
B. How Many Bad Things Happen to Good Employees?
Courts created wrongful discharge law on a foundation of anecdotes
drawn from the peculiar sample of cases that reach state courts. In
general, anecdotes are a poor basis for public policy. Anecdotes gathered
by surveying people in lawsuits are even worse. The grim picture of the
workplace those anecdotes paint is contradicted by the evidence that does
exist about the extent of the problems employees face in the workplace.
In two surveys done before the rise of the common law wrongful dis-
charge remedies-a time when employees were presumably at their most
vulnerable-investigators asked employees about an extensive list of
44. Both ignore an additional consequence of their analysis: if N at-will employees are
"unjustifiably discharged," then, presumably, some number close to N of others are hired to fill their
places. If changing the rule succeeds in reducing "irrational discharges," it will also increase the
number of unemployed people who are unable to find work. That may be good or bad socially, but
if I am unemployed, it is clearly bad from my perspective.
45. Some authors view economic pressures as simply another reason for state intervention. See,
e.g., Craver, supra note 12, at 1630.
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employer abuses. The questions included whether the supervisor or per-
sonnel department went into personal matters; required the respondent to
take personality tests; collected ratings on the respondent from others; ran
a credit check on prospective employees or the respondent; collected med-
ical information on the respondent; collected other personal information on
the respondent; divulged personal information either inside or outside the
company; required particular activities during the respondent's own time;
pressured the respondent into thinking, voting, or acting in a particular
way; or invaded the respondent's privacy in some other way.' What is
so striking about the results is that almost no employees reported any of the
individually named violations. The main complaint, and the only one that
more than two percent of all workers in the survey noted, was the collec-
tion of "other personal information" about employees by supervisors.
Thus, when asked directly about the types of abuses which are alleged to
lead routinely to abusive discharges, employees not protected by formal,
state-mandated legal job security did not indicate this was a serious
problem.
III. A Foundation of Sand
Read as a whole, the courts' and critics' assertions imply a model of
the labor market with five key features:
1. employees are routinely fired for irrational reasons;
2. employers do not consider the impact of firing an employee;
3. proving just-cause is neither costly nor difficult;
4. the at-will rule produces large negative externalities; and
5. employees underestimate their risk of job loss.
This paints a grim picture of the United States workplace. Irrational or
simply mean employers abound, firing employees at random or for the
most morally reprehensible reasons. Not only do these employers wreak
financial and emotional havoc upon their former employees, but their
unrestrained abuse of employees is financially detrimental both to their own
firms and to the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole. How
could such a dreadful situation come about?
The short answer is that it has not. The focus on individuals with
colorable claims of irrational discharges has led the critics and courts
astray. The question is how often these circumstances exist, something on
which the courts have no data. This focus on sad individual tales also
46. See SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, SURVEY OF WORKING CONDMTONs 335 (1970); ROBERT P.
QUINN Er AL., 1972-73 QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT SURVEY (1975). I calculated the results reported
by removing those not employed by others from the data and then calculating percentages. I attempted
a number of divisions of the data (by sex, race, occupation, and so on) and did not find any significant
differences in the results among any subgroup of employees.
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leads the critics to ignore the institutional structure of the employment
relationship. Because the analysis occurs in the context of a single
deserving individual and his callous emploer, courts generally fail to
consider the problems of asset specificity, bounded rationality, and
opportunism that the at-will relationship,47 rather than the at-will legal
rule, is successful at accommodating under some circumstances.
Even the most skeptical critic of the discipline of the market would
have to concede that the profit motive would force at least some employers
to adopt rational management techniques that would preclude such
behavior. Indeed, the rise of the modem corporation with its bureaucracies
provides an additional motive: even if they care nothing for the
stockholders' profits, personnel managers would seek to restrain arbitrary
firings by line managers to protect their own powers and positions. Of
course, there are bad personnel managers, just as there are bad
accountants, bad engineers, and bad lawyers. Some may even be petty or
immoral people who regularly treat others-not just employees-harshly
and insensitively. It is not clear, however, that such people will respond
to the discipline of the legal system any better than they respond to the
discipline of the marketplace. Simply commanding all arbitrary or unfair
actions of any type to cease will not stop them, and until there is some
evidence that such a command is likely to be obeyed by the people whose
behavior we want to change, the wisdom of creating a legal command is
in doubt.'
A. Employees Are Routinely Fired for Irrational Reasons
Generalizing from cases brought by ex-employees claiming wrongful
discharge, rather than on the experiences of the far larger group of
employees who do not lose their jobs, legal commentators have concluded
that employers routinely discharge employees for arbitrary, irrational,
illegal, or immoral reasons. How can employers persist in such behavior
despite market pressure to adopt more rational discharge policies?49 The
47. An at-will relationship could be created by a contract or by the at-will rule.
48. Some people think it is appropriate for the law to play a moral role, forbidding behavior even
when the state is incapable of enforcing its prohibition. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
196 (1986) ("The law... is constantly based on notions of morality .... ."). I think Bowers provides
a convincing argument why such a role is inappropriate. Even if there is a role for exhortation here,
exhortations typically do not involve creation of private rights of action, which exist for enforcement
and compensation purposes.
49. If, as critics suggest, employees value job security highly, employers who provide protection
against arbitrary and irrational discharges are likely to be able to pay their employees less and so give
an advantage over those who do not provide job security. Moreover, all available evidence suggests
that managers who provide a favorable work unit climate are rewarded with "higher returns on assets
and sales and faster growth in revenue" than those who do not. Karen L. Newman & Stanley D.
Nollen, The Effect of Work Unit Climate on Performance, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 26, at 42, 50.
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critics claim that employers and employees fail to negotiate efficient levels
of job security, falling back on the default at-will contract, because
bargaining over job security is sufficiently costly that employers and
employees are unable to vary the terms of individual employees'
contracts.' The choice the firm faces, however, is not limited to a choice
of individual negotiation or the default at-will rule. Firms could easily
choose a different rule for all or some of their employees by offering
renewable term contractss or by simply announcing a different rule for
a class of employees, just as many firms do now with respect to proba-
tionary employees52 or for management and union employees. 3 Firms
routinely rely on schedules that list pay and fringe benefits by employee
status or job title, which could include, at minimal cost, job security
provisions.' Thus the firm could obtain a result that approximates the
benefits of individually negotiated contracts with an internal rule providing
more job security than the at-will rule.' Since firms do not routinely
50.
[I]ndividualized bargaining is impractical because negotiating with a large number of
employees in a firm and maintaining adequate records of job security terms involve high
administrative costs. Employers and employees generally fail to bargain over job security
and instead rely on a 'standard' at will term because they are unwilling to incur the costs
of individually negotiating a limitation on the employer's power to discharge. Thus, the
parties are deterred from making a more complete contract, and the duration of
employment is left indefinite.
Note, supra note 15, at 1830-31.
51. See, e.g., Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(upholding the express terms of a renewable term contract against an employee seeking to imply an
obligation of continued renewal absent good cause).
52. Finns frequently do this in the employee handbooks which form the basis for the implied-
contract exception to the at-will nile. See, e.g., Garza v. United Child Care, Inc., 536 P.2d 1086,
1087 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the claim that status as a "permanent" employee was more than
an indication of nonprobationary status).
53. A frequent source of cases challenging the at-will nile is the promotion of an employee out
of a unionized job into a management job and that employee's subsequent dismissal. See, e.g., Page
v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1157-58 (4th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Carpenter Technology
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (D. Conn. 1989); Pinnix v. Babcock and Wilcox, Inc., 689 F. Supp.
634, 636 (N.D. Miss. 1988); Wilson v. Vulcan Rivet and Bolt Corp., 439 So. 2d 65, 66-67 (Ala.
1983); Gesina v. General Elec. Co., 780 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Clay v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 71 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ky. 1934); Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371,
373-74 (N.M. 1989).
54. Firms currently offer employees benefit menus of many types. Large employers may offer
a large choice of health insurance plans, for example, and many employers offer menus allowing
employees to allocate benefit dollars among multiple categories. Similar provisions could be made for
job security.
55. A bit more formally, suppose the firm and employee produce a joint surplus of p under the
at-will rule, and could produce a joint surplus of p' > p under an alternative rule that provided the
employee with greater job security. The firm receives a proportion a of the surplus. The firm's cost
of negotiating the alternative rule is t. The critics' argument is that ap' - t < ap, or, rearranging
terms, thatt > (p' - p)a. Since the critics argue that both a and the difference (p' - p) are large, in
order for the inequality to be true t must also be large. Yet, as discussed above, the cost to the firm
of implementing an alternative rule approximating individual negotiation is not large.
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take these low-cost steps, there must be something more than "transaction
costs" preventing them from doing so.
Indeed there is: the reported cases provide an extensive supply of
stories of an employee's dismissal for reasons that any disinterested
observer would find stupid, if not immoral.56 Many critics and judges
therefore assume that employers value the ability to discharge at will
because they can force their employees to commit bad acts."
However, if employers have sufficient bargaining power to force
employees to join the Elks, save the rain forest, or commit perjury, they
will drive their employees to the minimum utility level in the bargain,
regardless of the degree of job security provided by law, by readjusting the
other terms of the contract if a just-cause rule is legally mandated. Society
may end up with fewer Elks, less rain forest, and less perjury, but it is not
clear that employees will end up better off as a group. Nor is it at all clear
that there will be less perjury: employers who want employees who are
willing to commit perjury may simply screen prospective employees more
carefully or adopt incentive structures that share the benefits of perjury as
well as the risks.
To rescue the critics' argument, suppose further that under an alternative rule that provides more
job security, the firm loses some bargaining power so that the firm gets a'p', with a' < a. The trans-
action costs argument is now that a p' - t < ap or tla > (I-Q) p' - p, where Q = [(a - a')a] > 0.
If t is not large, and (using the critics' assumptions) a is large, the transactions costs criticism requires
that the loss to the firm from the change in bargaining power (a - a') be relatively large in magnitude.
If, however, the firm's bargaining power is assumed to be large under the at-will rule, to prevent the
firm from imposing the change in the default rule the change in the rule must prevent the employee
from credibly committing to a contract that offers her a wage of (1 - a)p + e, where e (employee's
effort) is small and the level of job security is that provided by the new rule. Again, this is difficult
to reconcile with the claim of a de minimis effect on employers. This is also inconsistent with the
critics' claim that the change will not significantly restrict the employer's ability to discharge employees
when necessary and that firms do not benefit from the at-will rule.
56. For example, employees have alleged they were discharged for refusing to commit perjury,
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); or for
serving on a jury, Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (Or. 1975).
57. In some of these cases the employee is obliged by the threat of discharge to engage in legal
activities outside of work in which they would not otherwise choose to engage. In others the
employer's "bad act" is alleged to impose a social cost (other than the reduction in social efficiency
from the employee being forced away from the optimum) as well as a private cost on the employee.
One example of employer bad acts is attempts to influence employees' political choices. See,
e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (employee allegedly fired for not
participating in his employer's lobbying campaign); Chavez, 777 P.2d at 372 (employee allegedly fired
after complaining that his employer sent a mailgram urging a vote on asbestos reform legislation in the
employee's name despite his explicit refusal to participate in a lobbying campaign); Chin v. AT&T,
410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979), appeal denied,
396 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1979) (employee allegedly discharged because he held "certain political beliefs
and associations"). Whether such attempts are "bad acts" or not depends on the point of view from
which they are evaluated. Ben and Jerry's, for example, requires employees to participate in the
company's "social mission." Workers who do not participate lose points, which can prevent wage
increases. Ultimately, employees who do not participate can be fired. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 79.
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Another potential motive is to steal from employees by violating the
implicit contracts employers have formed with their employees regarding
the totality of employment.5" The critics argue such contracts must be
legally enforceable to prevent employer opportunism. There are reasons
to be skeptical of this argument. First, an employer that systematically
violates its implicit contracts risks discovery of its opportunistic behavior
by current and prospective employees, with the result that current
employees will leave and future employees will refuse to accept the implicit
contracts.5 9
Second, Richard Epstein's question "Who cares if he is fired by an
employer who cheats him regularly?"' has a great deal of force here.
Peter Linzer's answer of "the person who now has no job cares greatly"
61
is incomplete. The opportunistically fired employee is worse off only
under some circumstances.62 Moreover, the whole point of the critique
of the at-will rule is that it results in people losing good, hard-to-replace
jobs, not bad jobs. Losing a job in which the employee is regularly
cheated may cause a period of unemployment. It is not as likely to result
in the employee suffering a significant future income loss as does moving
from a good to a bad job.
Since the essence of being an employer is having the power to direct
the actions of your employees, the critics' complaints often amount to little
58. They are implicit contracts rather than explicit contracts because the explicit contract takes the
form of "if you are employed at time X, you will receive $Y" while the implicit contract is to employ
the employee until time Z. If there were an explicit agreement as to duration, the at-will rule would
not apply.
59. OuvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 261 (1985). In such
schemes, employers opportunistically discharge employees until the expected cost to the employees of
opportunistic discharge is at most equal to the expected cost to employees of job security provisions.
See Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510,
523-25 (1989). Under those conditions, employees are indifferent between at-will and just-cause
contracts, so imposing a just-cause standard does not raise employees' utility. (This is true unless it
is accomplished in a manner that makes it a transfer of income from employers to the employees, which
is a different justification from the issue of opportunism.) Further, the question of the distributional
effects within the class of employees arises again. Those employees whose implicit contracts are not
violated may be-and indeed will be if employers react to the imposition of a just-cause rule-worse
off when the rules are changed because the terms of their contracts will be altered.
60. Richard A. Epstein, Agency Costs, Employment Contracts, andLabor Unions, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSmEsS 127, 138 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985).
61. Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown
of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 413 (1986).
62. The discharged employee is, of course, worse off than if he had had the same job and not been
discharged, but that was not his choice when he took the job. The employee chose this job over other
jobs, with their respective wage-job, security-benefit combinations. Whether he would still take this job
knowing he would be opportunistically fired later will depend on when he is fired, his discount rate,
and his other options. Personal discount rates differ dramatically. George Lowenstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECoN. PERSP. 181, 184 (Fall 1989). These differences
prevent a comprehensive answer about all employees' welfare from being determinable.
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more than disagreements over whether they think an employer's acts are
appropriate. It does not require modifying the at-will rule to deal with the
few truly stupid employers who suborn perjury or incite employees to
avoid jury duty; it merely requires enforcing existing laws against criminal
behavior or adopting narrow laws prohibiting discharges based on jury
service. Similarly, if the problem is not the regular fleecing of employees
by massive numbers of unscrupulous employers but occasional arbitrary
and irrational actions by a few, then no basis for a large-scale reordering
of the workplace arises.
B. Employers Do Not Consider the Impact of Firing on Employees
While the courts and critics generally assume that employees suffer
considerable losses when they lose their jobs,63 employers, on the other
hand, are generally assumed to face insignificant costs in replacing
employees.' Combined with this disparity in costs is the "problem" of
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. This was
the central theme of Blades's early, and still influential, critique of the at-
will rule. The issue of relative bargaining power could simply reflect
63. See K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987) (noting the dependence and
economic vulnerability of an employee in relation to his employer); Darlington v. General Elec., 504
A.2d 306, 309 ( Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (contending that the philosophy underlying employment-at-will
"failed to consider the lack of bargaining power in an individual employee, i.e., that there can be no
freedom of contract between parties of grossly unequal bargaining power"); Little v. Bryce, 733
S.W.2d 937, 940-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ) (Levy, J., concurring) ("Losing
a job today, in this age of increasing technology, specialization of employee skills, and an unstable, if
not contracting, economy, is very risky for the worker whose livelihood depends entirely upon his
labor."). These include search costs, lost wages and benefits, lower future earnings, and a wide range
of noneconomic costs such as lessened self-esteem, increased illness, and stress. See, e.g., Nora J.
Pasman, The Public Interest Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: From Crime Victims to
Whistleblowers, Will the Real Public Policy Please Stand Up?, 70 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 559, 572
(1993) (noting that when an employee is fired, she is "faced with all the personal consequences,
outrageous offense and despair associated with such an economic tragedy"); Cheryl S. Massengale, At-
Will Employment: Going, Going. . ., 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187, 201 (1990) (noting the existence of
"[b]oth psychological and economic effects on individuals who lose their jobs").
64. This alleged disparity in costs also prompts many critics to conclude that because employers
do not consider the total cost of discharge, they discharge too many employees. Even if it were true
that employers did not suffer significant losses when an employee is incorrectly discharged and that
discharged employees always suffer large losses, it would not follow that employers would not consider
the effect of discharge on employees; the size of that effect would determine the effectiveness of
discharge as a penalty for violating the employers' work rules.
65. Blades, supra note 2, at 1411-12 ("Only the unusually valuable employee has sufficient
bargaining power to obtain a guarantee that he will be discharged... only for 'just cause'"). Blades
is still cited as an authoritative critique. See, e.g., In re Hotstuf Foods, Inc., 95 B.R. 355, 357
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 744 (Ala. 1987)
(Maddox, J., dissenting); Holmes v. Union Oil Co., 760 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
Unequal bargaining power was also the main concern voiced by Commons and Andrews in their earlier
analysis of at-will employment. JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR
LEGISLATION 373-74 (4th rev. ed. 1936). Even the Mississippi Supreme Court, which has not been
1920
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a desire to redistribute income from employers to employees, but many
critics argue that this inequity results in contracts whose result is lowered
social welfare, not just an unappealing distribution of income.
66
Assuming these effects are true, this argument rests on unsupported
assumptions about the value of legal job security.67 This criticism rests
on the implicit assumption that employees want additional job security. Of
course, holding everything else constant, most rational people would prefer
jobs with more security rather than less. However, in the real world all
else is rarely constant and employees must make tradeoffs between
different job characteristics. It may be, therefore, that some employees
prefer jobs with more of some other characteristic (money, for example)
and less job security to jobs with less of the other characteristic and more
job security.
There is a simple means of determining preferences: ask people about
their preferences for different job characteristics. The General Social
Survey (GSS), a large national opinion poll conducted annually by the
receptive to arguments to overturn the at-will rule, noted its regret in upholding a contract that had an
explicit at-will provision: "Conceding as an illusion that the parties are in a posture of economic parity
one with the other, particularly in ability to absorb the consequences of termination, we consider it our
obligation to enforce the contract as written ... Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 249 (Miss.
1985).
66. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 12, at 1626 (claiming employment security produces increased
social welfare through increased commitment to employers, reduced turnover, and increased training
of employees); Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 12, at 170. There are economic
arguments about the "efficiency" of different income distributions, and the consequences of income
redistribution are also usefully analyzed with economic tools. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Equality,
in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A NEW DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 169, 171 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987); Erik 0. Wright, Inequality, in THE NEW PALRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra,
at 815, 817-18. These are not, however, the arguments made by the critics.
67. The question remains whether such a change in legal rules will actually produce the redistribu-
tion the critics desire, and if it does, what the distributional effects will be within the class of
employees. No reason indicates that all employees should equally value legal job security. Since em-
ployers with significant bargaining power will undoubtedly alter other terms of the employment rela-
tionship to compensate for the loss of the ability to fire at will, different employees will experience dif-
ferent levels of transfers from employers, and some employees, particularly those who place little value
on legal job security, may experience a net loss. These intraclass effects of a change in the rules have
been ignored. The claim that employees value job security highly is generally based on the example
of employees who have made high job-specific human capital investments and who thus suffer the
greatest cost fromjob loss. These employees are, by defmition, highly skilled and highly compensated.
At the other extreme, low-wage, low-skill employees' primary loss is from a period of unemployment
between low-wage jobs. They have less to gain in absolute terms from the imposition of job security
and the most to lose from reduced employment opportunities caused by the increase in the cost to firms
of hiring additional employees.
Since low-wage, low-skill employees are also the most vulnerable to employer strategic reactions
to the imposition ofjust cause (through worsened working conditions or lower wages), they also stand
to lose the most from the employer's strategic response. Imposing a just-cause rule, therefore, may
most likely lead to a net loss for the most vulnerable group. If their wages are low enough that the
minimum wage is a binding constraint, they may be protected from some wage-related strategic
behavior by employers.
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National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, has asked
about individuals' preferences for job characteristics, including job
security, since 1973.68 One question regularly included in the GSS asks
individuals to rank five job characteristics:
1. no chance of being fired;
2. high income;
3. chances for advancement;
4. job is meaningful and provides a feeling of accomplishment; and
5. short hours.69
The responses for all years are presented in Table 3.70 As Table 3 shows,
job security comes in a distant fourth, ahead of only short working hours
in the number of people ranking it either first or second.
Table 3: Job Characteristic Rankings
Job Characteristic Number Choosing Rank of Characteristic
(percent in parentheses)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
No Danger of Being 1178 2190 3405 5367 4487
Fired (7.1) (13.2) (12.3) (19.3) (27.0)
610 1364 1869 4004 8780(3.7) (8.2) (11.2) (24.1) (52.8)
Work Important and 8204 3116 2318 1896 1093
Feeling of
Accomplishment (49.2) (18.7) (13.9) (11.4) (6.6)
Chances for 3124 5861 3906 2386 1350
Advancement (18.8) (35.2) (23.5) (14.4) (8.1)
High Income 3511 4096 5129 2974 917
1L_ 1(21.1) (24.6) (30.8) (17.9) (5.5)
N = 16,627 (all who answered question in years asked).
68. James A. Davis & Tom W. Smith, General Social Survey, 1972-1991 (machine-readable data
file). The question was asked in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, and 1987-91.
69. Id. Individuals were shown a card with the five characteristics listed on it in a random order.
They were asked: "Would you please look at this card and tell me which one thing on the list you
would most prefer in a job?" Then they were asked: "Which comes next?" "Which is third most
important?" and "Which is fourth most important?" JAMES A. DAVIS & TOM W. SMITH, GENERAL
SOcIAL SURVEYS, 1972-1991: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 230-32 (1991). This is obviously a less-than-
perfect question, but it does provide some evidence. Perhaps a better question would provide different
evidence-but the burden rests on the proponents of change to provide such evidence.
70. Table 3 includes the data for all responses to this question in all years asked (16,627
respondents). See JAMES A. DAVIS & TOM W. SMITH, THE NORC GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY: A
USER'S GuInE 74 (1992).
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A factor analysis of these data reduces the five dimensions to three.71
The results of the factor analysis are given in Table 4. All three factors
have natural interpretations as tradeoffs between different job
characteristics. Factor 1 can be interpreted as a meaningfulness-promotion
tradeoff, Factor 2 as an hours-income tradeoff, and Factor 3 as a tradeoff
between job security and all other job characteristics. These results
demonstrate empirically what is intuitively obvious-different employees
have different preferences about job security. Legal rules which apply one-
size-fits-all standards of job security will inevitably disadvantage some
employees. Default rules, like the at-will rule,' allow individuals
freedom to find employment situations which more closely approximate
their preferences. The existence of impediments to bargaining over job
security is an argument for removing the impediments, not intruding the
state into private relationships to advantage some employees and disad-
vantage other employees.
Table 4: Rotated Factor Matrix of Job Characteristic Data
Job Characteristic I Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor ]
No Danger of Being Fired -0.02161 0.02586 0.99608
Short Working Hours 0.11563 0.89041 -0.20784
Work Important and Feeling 0.82047 0.04237 -0.20364
of Accomplishment
Chances for Advancement -0.86888 -0.07812 -0.17276
High Income -0.00769 -0.78817 -0.41130
The responses to the GSS questions also reveal important differences
among various groups. These responses are summarized in Table 5,1
which shows the percentage of each group ranking the various character-
istics first or second. Union members rank job security more highly than
71. A varimax rotation was used. Factor analysis is based on the assumption that the variation
in a set of N variables is due to the variation in a set of K<N underlying unobserved factors. See
HARRY H. HARMAN, MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS 4 (3d ed. 1976). For a brief, less technical explana-
tion of factor analysis, see JAE-ON KIM & CHARLES W. MUELLER, INTRODUCTION TO FACTOR
ANALYSIS 7 (1978) and JAE-ON KIM & CHARLES W. MUELLER, FACTOR ANALYSIS: STATISTICAL
MEMHODS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES (1978).
72. Just-cause rules are generally not implemented as default rules because people would contract
around them.
73. Table details: Respondents whose spouse belonged to a union but who did not themselves
belong to a union (674 respondents) were excluded (the results were not significantly different if they
were included as union members). Total respondents: 1,633 union members, 8,205 nonmembers;
7,420 men, 9,207 women; 13,973 white, 2,654 nonwhite.
1996] 1923
Texas Law Review
do nonmembers and rank chances for advancement less highly than do
nonmembers-responses consistent with the benefits and costs of union-
sector jobs.74 Nonwhites rank job security more highly than do whites,
and men rank it more highly than do women. These results are significant
in several ways. First, nonwhites are far more likely than whites to face
discharge due to racial or ethnic prejudice, and so Title VII, which has
largely become a vehicle for wrongful discharge suits in recent years, 75
is available as an avenue of redress. Second, to the extent that common-
law remedies carry costs with them, the net benefit of a common-law
remedy is likely to vary over groups and will be greater for men as a
group than for women as a group.76
Table 5: Group Differences in Job Characteristic Rankings
Job Chances for Meaningful High Shorter
Security Advancement Work Pay Hours
Union 26.0"* 48.7"* 61.4* 51.0"" 13.0
Member
Not Union 18.6"* 55.1" 69.8"* 45.0"* 11.3
Member
Male 22.6"* 52.6"" 64.6"*  47.7"* 12.5"*
Female 18.5"* 55.2"* 70.8"" 44.2"" 11.4"
White 18.4 *" 54.9"* 72.2"* 42.8"* 11.8*
Nonwhite 30.0"* 49.6"* 46.5"* 61.5"* 12.4"
difference significant at 5 % level; ** difference significant at 1 % level
Critics of the at-will rule also argue that it is unfair that employees
who belong to a union or have a public-sector job receive more legal job
74. Unions generally reduce "dispersion of earnings within and across establishments" and reduce
the "effect of standard wage-determining factors on earnings." Richard B. Freeman, Unionism and
the Dispersion of Wages, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 23 (1980). Union jobs have many charac-
teristics that differ from other jobs. Perhaps most importantly, union members "pay" for the legal job
security benefits they receive in many ways: they pay union dues, accept a greater role for seniority
in advancement and layoffs, limit the potential for merit-based advancement, and so forth. See
Katharine G. Abraham & James L. Medoff, Length of Service and Layoffs in Union and Nonunion
Work Groups, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 87, 89 (1984) (citing survey results finding that 78% of
union hourly groups were covered by written policies that specify seniority as the most important factor
to be considered in permanent layoff decisions compared to 16% of nonunion hourly groups). Selecting
out one characteristic of these jobs is a shaky foundation for an argument from fairness. Moreover,
this argument denies that employees make choices about their jobs.
75. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 33, at 984.
76. This is even more true to the extent that Title VII largely serves to protect women rather than
men in sex-based discrimination cases.
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security than employees who do not.' This argument is based on the
false assumption that all employees' preferences for job security are alike,
the failure to recognize that union-sector and public-sector employees have
traded significant job characteristics for their job security, and a paternal-
istic vision of the State's giving employees what they need, regardless of
their preferences.
Employees do care about job security, but they care about other
aspects of jobs as well. To the extent that employees are able to find jobs
that match their preferences, the provision of jobs with varying degrees of
job security is evidence not that employers do not consider the impact of
firing on employees, but rather that the labor market is able to succeed in
satisfying employee preferences despite its imperfections.
C. Proving Just Cause Is Neither Costly nor Difficult
If an employee is unproductive for whatever reason, the critics claim,
the employer should be able to prove it easily, to a jury or other fact
finder. The primary costs of proof are assumed to be the legal fees for the
employer in defending wrongful discharge suits. By advocating an
arbitration-like mechanism instead of court suits, the critics argue that costs
can be reduced to a minimal level.
Just cause does not simply mean that more evidence is necessary to
support a claim that an employee is performing poorly.7" It means that
poor performance must be proven to an outsider, so verifiable evidence
will be needed. More broadly, the difference is that under an' at-will
regime the firm can act on observable but not verifiable evidence, while
under a just-cause rule the firm requires verifiable evidence. 9 Consider
77. Professor Peck, for example, contends that
[t]he sharp contrast between the protection available to public employees and that available
to private employees should cause us to ask whether there is justification for that
difference. The justification for permitting termination of employment without cause
grows even more difficult when consideration is given the fact that twenty-five percent of
the private nonagricultural work force is now represented by labor unions.
Cornelius J. Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Persons Discharged from Private Employment, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 313, 315 (1979). See also Craver, supra note 12, at 1643 (advocating statutory just-
cause rules as well as significant increases in federal wage and fringe benefit floors). The proportion
of the private nonagricultural workforce represented by unions has continued to decline: in 1994 it was
12.0%. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACt OF THE
UNrrED STATES 445 (115th ed. 1995) (Table 698: Union Members, by Selected Characteristics: 1983
and 1994).
78. Economic analysis of the employment-at-will rule has focused on the effects on employees of
reducing the chance of being fired. In the formal models of the at-will and just-cause rules, effort has
been held fixed. David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies When Unemployment Is a Worker
Discipline Device, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 902 (1989). The more informal economic discussions in
the legal literature have made similar assumptions.
79. See BRUCE HARRISON & J. MICHAEL McGUmE, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
POuCIES 33.02 (1991) ("Too frequently, employers face substantial hurdles in defending themselves
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a typical set of factual contentions from a wrongful discharge suit: the
discharged employee alleges that he was fired for some reason that violates
public policy, while the employer claims the employee was fired for poor
performance. The final decision at this company rests with the vice
president for human relations, who has an "open door" policy allowing
employees to bring their complaints to her. The employee and the
supervisor both tell the vice president their stories. Under the at-will rule
the vice president makes her decision based on her knowledge of the firm
and the participants. At the very least, she will know the supervisor better
than an outside decisionmaker would and can use this information to
evaluate the supervisor's claims about the employee's job performance.
Under a just-cause rule, however, the vice president must consider
how her decision will look to the outside decisionmaker. A statement by
her that the supervisor has always been truthful in the past and that she
puts great weight on his judgment will not be persuasive evidence to an
outsider, since the vice president has every incentive to make that statement
even if it is not true. So even a supervisor with a record of finding
performance problems is likely to be sent back for documentation if he
comes in with an unverifiable claim of poor performance.
Using a very simple model analogizing just cause to a tax on effort
levels,'o mandating just-cause protection appears problematic in a
heterogeneous labor market." The insight offered by the model is
straightforward: Requiring employers to prove with verifiable evidence that
their discharge decisions meet a standard of cause will result in employers
substituting tasks which produce verifiable outputs for those which produce
merely observable outputs. To the extent that observable but not verifiable
outputs exist, they are likely to be the product of creative, high-skill jobs.
Reducing those types of outputs leads to a reduction in welfare for both
employees and employers.
If we assume a simple labor market in which jobs differ only in their
responsiveness to the employee's investment in effort, the at-will rule is
more efficient for the more responsive jobs.' Highly skilled, highly
against challenges to disciplinary and discharge decisions involving these subjective evaluations because
they give rise to issues that can only be resolved by two fact finders believing or not believing the
contradictory statements of union witnesses."); DOUGLAS H. THOMPSON, DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE:
ARBITRALENFORCEMENT UNDERTHE COLLECnVEBARGAINING AGREEMENT atix (1989) (arguing that
"the question of whether an involuntary ending of an employment relationship is truly for 'cause'
properly follows objective standards that are derived from sound legal principles").
80. See infra Appendix.
81. The version here is constrained by the limitations of the symposium format. For a more de-
tailed version of this model, see Andrew P. Morriss, The Law and Economics of Employment-At-Will
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on file with author).
82. In terms of the model in the Appendix, for sufficiently large values of the parameter 6, the
cubed term dominates the others.
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compensated employees-those most likely to be able to bring a common-
law wrongful discharge action-are more likely to be in such jobs than are
assembly-line workers. The common law's provision of a remedy-in-fact
to the former and not to the latter maximizes the inefficiencies associated
with displacement of the at-will rule.'a
Such a simple model does not "prove" the inadequacy of the just-
cause rule. It does identify how incorrectly assuming that proving just-
cause is neither costly nor difficult can significantly reduce the welfare of
employers and employees. The question then is whether proving just cause
is costly. A definitive answer awaits a suitable empirical investigation into
employers' costs and behavior. The evidence we have, however, suggests
that employers think it is costly and difficult.'
D. The At-Will Rule Produces Large Negative Externalities
Critics make this argument in three ways: employers do not fully
consider the cost of discharges to (i) themselves, (ii) employees, and (iii)
society in general.
The first is not a credible claim.s5 Firms which ignore significant
internal costs are not firms for long.' Those that do survive are at a
serious competitive disadvantage. Personnel managers are just as capable
of reading the literature on which these claims are based as are lawyers,
and they have a much greater incentive to do so. Moreover, there are
significant reasons why employers provide job security voluntarily.
83. Where just-cause remedies are instituted, reducing the costs of proof will reduce the inefficien-
cies associated with the rule. Reducing the costs of proof brings the variables' values closer to the
values under the at-will rule and so reduces the inefficiencies introduced by the just-cause rule. To
reduce the costs of proof requires more than simply decreasing attorneys' fees. Allowing employers
to defend discharge decisions based on good faith rather than requiring discharges to be objectively
justified, for example, would reduce the costs of proof significantly. Similarly, shifting decisions on
wrongful termination claims to decisionmakers less likely to be swayed by sympathy-replacing lay
juries with arbitrators, for example-would also reduce the cost of proof since the amount of evidence
needed to convince such a decisionmaker would be less.
84. See, e.g., JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, RAND INST. FOR CIL JUSTICE,
LABOR MARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABILITY 49-52 (1992) (offering evidence of significant
declines in employment following adoption of common-law exceptions to the at-will rule).
85. Employers also incur costs when an employee is discharged. If the employee is replaced, they
incur recruiting costs, training costs, and lost production before the employee is replaced and during
the training period for the replacement. They also lose the benefit of any specific human capital the
discharged employee had accumulated. In addition, the employer suffers a loss in productivity from
the remaining employees, who are demoralized by the arbitrary firing of their colleague. Id. at 36-40.
86. Unless, of course, they are able to secure government subsidies. Chrysler Corporation, for
example, was rewarded for its spectacular failure to remain competitive in the auto industry with a $3.5
billion debt-restructuring package which included a federal loan guarantee of $1.5 billion. Chrysler
Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324; REGINALD STUART, BAILOUT: THE
STORY BEHIND AMERICA'S BILLION DOLLAR GAMBLE ON THE 'NEW' CHRYSLER CORPORATION 199
(1980).
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Economists Katherine Abraham and James Medoff, who can hardly be
considered apologists for employers, found in their early 1980s survey that
"in over 80 percent of private sector nonagricultural, nonconstruction
employment, senior workers enjoy substantial protection against losing
their jobs."' They went on to suggest reasons why employers voluntarily
provide job security: avoiding unionization, maintaining morale to preserve
short-term efficiency, and attracting new hires.
88
With respect to the second, although employers do not directly incur
the costs of firing suffered by employees, they must still consider the size
of the loss. The degree of the penalty (firing) is an important part of the
structure of the discipline scheme the employer chooses. The costlier the
penalty is to the employee, the less the employer must spend on detection
to impose a given discipline scheme, for example. Moreover,
employees must consider these costs in determining their behavior under a
given discipline scheme, which is also something the employer must
consider. Again, employers' self-interest will dictate that they will
consider these costs. 90
The critics' third argument is based on the claim that unfair discharges
alienate the discharged employees, which in turn causes a wide range of
social problems. 9' A forced change to a just-cause regime reduces the
number of "bad" firing decisions and therefore alienation. If simply
identifying a source of "alienation" were all that was required to justify
state intervention, we should expect restrictions on the ability to publish
87. Abraham & Medoff, supra note 74, at 96.
88. Id.
89. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
90. Consideration does not, however, mean the firm will not act; instead, it means simply that the
act will be taken in light of the costs. Interestingly, none of the critics' reform proposals suggest that
the outside decisionmaker will be empowered to consider these costs in deciding whether discharged
employees will win their cases. Presumably, fewer people will be discharged, but those who do will
still suffer these costs plus the additional cost of being labeled a lemon for having lost their discharge
case. Given that mistakes are inevitable, those who are mistakenly fired under ajust-cause regime will
bear a greater burden than those mistakenly fired under an at-will regime. Again the remedy imposes
greater losses on a few in return for alleged benefits to a larger group. Without some substantive
evidence, such utilitarian calculations are suspect and smack of Benthamism. Moreover, such claims,
even if supported by actual evidence, would be morally suspect because of their imposition of costs on
(presumptively) deserving members of the group whom the "reforms" are designed to help. Given the
critics' assumptions about risk aversion among employees generally, this cost is a particularly heavy
burden.
91. Brian F. Berger, Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-WillDismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV.
153, 168 (1981). Berger writes,
The public's interest in the employment relationship arises out of employment's
interdependence with a stable economy and worker productivity. The ethos of work is
important to workers in the United States. Job insecurity may lead to deteriorating moral
and psychological standards in the workforce. Moreover, actual job displacement may
result in political, financial, and social alienation of workers, all of which contribute to
underproductivity and other social and economic problems.
Id. (citations omitted).
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books and a host of other activities which offend and potentially "alienate"
others as well. Part of the point of a society based on individual rights is
that we need not consider (even if morally we should) such costs.
Further, eliminating the at-will rule may well produce externalities of
its own. Professor Gail Heriot argues persuasively that mandating job
security will lead employers to seek to impose restrictions on employees far
beyond those alleged to occur under the at-will rule. 2
E. Employees Significantly Underestimate Their Risk of Job Loss
Employees allegedly make "bad" bargains in the sense that if they had
known the true probabilities of discharge under the at-will and just-cause
rules, they would have chosen a just-cause contract.93 The root of the
problem is either the employee's misperception or the employer's
misrepresentations to the employee to encourage employees to accept lower
wages or to be more productive.9' The latter is covered by the common
law of fraud and does not require changes in employment law to prevent.
How bad is employees' information about job security likely to be?
One obvious characteristic of the at-will rule is that the legal responsibil-
ities of the employer are clear-it has none. How then are employees
systematically fooled? The critics of the at-will rule are silent on the
mechanism for this, aside from general references to psychological studies
that individuals underestimate the likelihood of experiencing bad events. 95
Some employees may at first mistakenly believe a crafty, opportunistic
employer who later takes advantage of them, but it is a large and unwar-
ranted step to conclude from this that employees in general systematically
fail to understand their personal risk of job loss.'
92. Gail L. Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contemporary Trends in
Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 167, 172-73 (1993).
93. This argument is that
[e]mployees may for a variety of reasons misperceive their best interests at the outset of
the employment relationship. For example, employees may tend to discount substantially
the risk of wrongful discharge, and as a result systematically undervalue job security.
This reflects a common psychological response; since most people prefer not to think
about the possibility of disaster, employees understandably tend to disregard the possibility
of job loss.
Note, supra note 15, at 1831 (foomotes omitted).
94. This is a common assumption about employee handbook provisions adopted by employers and
used by courts to impose just-cause requirements. For an example, see the leading case of Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980). See also Price v. Federal Express
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (D. Colo. 1987) ("Employers must realize that if they are going
to reap the profits and rewards of employee loyalty and enhanced workmanship which are coaxed by
implied promises made to the workforce, then such employers must be held to their word.").
95. See supra note 93.
96. Furthermore, employees' expectation that they will not be discharged or that they will be
treated fairly is not the same thing as a belief that they have an enforceable legal claim if they are
discharged without "just cause."
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One thing we do know about employees is that they know much more
about their particular employer, its practices, and their circumstances than
lawyers and economists do. What appears to an outsider as underesti-
mation of the risk of discharge may be actually the result of the different
information available to insiders. 7 Employees' perceptions of the like-
lihood of discharge will be based on: (i) their observations about the fate
of other employees of their employer; (ii) their observations of the fate of
people they know who work for other employers; (iii) general knowledge
from the media and other sources; (iv) their knowledge of their perfor-
mance and their employer's assessment of their performance; and (v) their
knowledge of the practices of their employer, as gleaned from personnel
handbooks, conversations with managers, and the like.
The employer can directly affect only the last of these sources.
Indirectly, the employer could lie to employees about why other employees
were fired, raising doubt among the employees that a discharged
employee's story of arbitrary discharge is true, or structure the workplace
to hinder employees' exchange of information.98 The employer is not
likely, however, to be wholly successful in preventing the employees from
97. The ex post utility of job security provisions also depends not only on the true ex ante
probability of dismissal but also on the realization of the risk of job loss. Consider the example of
insurance: My demand for insurance stems from my preference for avoiding risk. If I face a risk that
I am unaware of and do not buy insurance to cover the risk, I am worse off ex post only if the risk is
realized or if I realize, too late to purchase insurance but with time to worry, that the risk exists. If
I never learn of the risk and it is never realized, by remaining ignorant of the risk I save the insurance
premium and am able to spend it on other items. (Since I did not know that the risk existed, I did not
experience any disutility from the worry about the unrealized risk.)
If employees' ex ante estimates of job-loss risk are systematically biased downward, the effect
on their utility will be different ex post for different subgroups. Those who do not lose their jobs are
better off ex post than if they had been correctly informed of the true risk ex ante, since they received
higher wages for the entire period of employment and did not lose theirjobs. Those who do lose their
jobs are potentially worse off ex post than if they had been correctly informed ex ante. Among this
group the net gain or loss will depend on how long they held their initial job, the difference in wages
between it and the subsequent job, their discount rate, and the length of any period of unemployment.
What is important to note is that some employees-those who are not discharged under the at-will
rule-are made worse off by learning the true probability of discharge since they must now buy
insurance. Only some employees who are actually discharged are made better off ex post. This
group's gains are thus financed, at least in part, by their fellow employees rather than by their
employers. Even if we assume the desirability of a transfer of wealth from employers to employees,
it is not clear that the increased job security would accomplish that aim without penalizing some
employees as well. Finally, since public corporations' stock is largely held by institutional stockholders
such as mutual funds and pension plans, even transfers from corporations to employees are often at the
expense of individuals who are not clearly better off than the beneficiaries of the transfers.
98. See, e.g., Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Wis. 1989). In Zinda, the
company used a newsletter to inform other employees of the basis for recent discharges. Id. at 550.
A dismissed employee sued the employer for defamation and invasion of privacy as well as wrongful
discharge. Id. at 556. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the employer's interest in communicating
with its employees to maintain morale to be a "common interest" entitled to privilege under Wisconsin
law. Id. at 553.
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making assessments of these factors. This is particularly true where the
employer frequently discharges employees, since a false and misleading
explanation that is credible the first time becomes less so when repeated for
the nth time.
Moreover, for a misperception-deception theory to be viable, the
number of misled employees actually discharged must be sufficiently small
that other employees do not learn the truth either by observation or from
the experiences of others (relatives, friends, neighbors, or coworkers).
Correcting the misperception-deception problem may therefore result in a
transfer of wealth from many employees to a relatively small group, a
result that is not necessarily acceptable even to the proponents of the just-
cause rule.
Much of the uncertainty in employees' careers today is the result of
changes in the economy which are beyond the ability of the law, common
or statutory, to prevent. Not only have firms been under significant
economic stress in recent years, but economic changes have meant changes
in career patterns and firms' internal labor markets as well.'
In one particularly significant development, structural change in the
U.S. economy has transformed the traditional, seniority-based career
ladder. Rosabeth Moss Kanter identified, for example, a significant shift
away from the traditional managerial career patterns in high-technology
firms.1° The consequences of these changes are significant both for the
99. Profound economic changes have occurred in the U.S. economy since the 1950s. Many of
these changes have had the result of introducing market forces into previously sheltered sectors of the
economy and, in particular, into areas inhabited primarily by relatively well-paid professional or
technical employees. Professor Richard Peterson, a commentator more than sympathetic to the plight
of these employees, summarized the changes as follows:
The element of cost discipline has become a growing reality to a greater segment
of the labor force. Once largely restricted to the factory floor, cost discipline governs
even professional employees. For example, public accounting and law firms use ever
tightening control devices such as billable hour competition to assure that everyone is
carrying his or her share of the load and also to assure comfortable partner bonuses. Top
management is continually reminded by the financial community that they need to improve
quarterly and yearly profits to maintain or improve stock price and assure better executive
bonuses. Telephone operators and service representatives are regularly monitored to
count the seconds that an operator takes to complete a call....
Uncertainty about one's job and income is far more evident in the labor force now
than it was 30 years ago. Historically most job layoffs affected the factory work force,
unless the plant, office, or company was closed. However, with the recessions of the
mid-1970s, early 1980s, and the most recent recession, managers and
professionals/technical began to share the brunt of unemployment.. . . These
traditionally privileged groups, in terms of pay, benefits, and job security, increasingly
find themselves vulnerable to economic events and top management mandates.
Richard B. Peterson, The Elements of Industrial Relations: A Retrospective View, in PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 26, at 176, 181-82.
100. Rosabeth M. Kanter, Variations in Managerial Career Structures in High-Technology Firms:
The Impact of Organizational Characteristics on Internal Labor Market Patterns, in INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS 109 (Paul Osterman ed., 1984). Kanter notes that, instead of careers marked by
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individual's career and for managerial level employees as a group. Not
only is there greater mobility due to increased managerial job opportunities
and a greater reliance on outside personnel for filling such vacancies, but
frequent reorganizations and rapid technological change lead to "less
overall stability in job and organizational structures.''
These changes in the economy are the true cause of misperceptions
about job security. It is not that employees underestimate their legal rights
but that the economy is in transition and economic job security is
dwindling. Whatever one may think about those changes, wrongful
discharge law is largely irrelevant to altering their impact.
F Summary
The critics' arguments do raise two important points, but on closer
examination those points undermine the case for abolishing the at-will rule.
First, many of the critics' arguments discussed above suggest that
employers do highly value the ability to fire at will.' °1 Given that
employers fail to exploit what the critics claim are substantial productivity
gains from providing job security, at-will contracts probably have some
efficiency characteristics of their own. The preference for at-will contracts
is at least partially explained by the "effort tax" effects of introducing
outside decisionmakers into the employment relationship.
Second, the distributional effects of a change from the employment-at-
will rule to a just-cause rule within the class of employees is an important
issue that has not been addressed by the critics. If the change results in a
net loss for low-wage, low-skill employees but a net gain for high-wage,
high-skill employees, then the critics' fairness claims are substantially
weakened on their own terms. Unfortunately, the distributional impact is
primarily an empirical question, which would be difficult to assess without
functionally based careers, with movement up a long ladder in a single function ....
career movement that is largely linear and vertical, with moves implying promotions to
a higher hierarchical level, . . . a long process of development from entry-level
management jobs to making key business decisions, with a large number of moves in-
between, [and] achievement of a general manager post (or top management position as
part of a chief executive's staff) relatively late in the career, [newer high-technology firms
often had managerial careers marked by] career movement that is often nonlinear or
lateral. ... a career arena that encompasses many units of the organization rather than
just one, . . . a rapid process of development from entry-level management jobs to
positions making key business decisions, in relatively few moves, [and] attainment of a
general manager-type position (or position on a chief executive's staff) relatively early in
the career.
Id. at 109-10.
101. Id. at 111-12.
102. Off-the-record interviews with employers and employers' counsel suggest the same. It is
possible that some of this value is the employers' desire for power over employees for its own sake.
It is unlikely that such cravings are widespread enough to explain the presumed high frequency of at-
will contracts.
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data on employment contracts. Such data do not exist. Nevertheless, one
must consider the possible within-class distributional impacts as well as the
between-class changes when arguing that at-will contracts are unfair.
IV. Conclusion
Based on overestimates of wrongful discharges, peculiar views of
labor markets, and overconfidence in the efficacy of state-imposed
solutions, courts and commentators have produced a complex and often
incoherent patchwork of reforms: public policy exceptions, unilateral
contract theories, newly discovered implied covenants, and tort theories.
These reforms have barely satisfied the appetites of some commentators for
state interference, of course, but courts and legislatures have been reluctant
to tamper too much with private employment relations.
The cure is in many respects worse than the disease. The legal
remedies provide effective relief only to the extent potential plaintiffs have
access to lawyers. Lawyers are available only to those who can pay, either
up front or through contingency fees combined with the potential for
substantial recovery. Since few discharged employees can afford to pay
attorneys by the hour or are discharged under circumstances which are
sufficiently egregious to generate damages large enough to compensate both
the ex-employee and her attorney, the remedy reduces to something of a
lottery. Moreover, because it is a game played with loaded dice, the ex-
employees most likely to win are those with high salaries to begin with
since their damages are greater. Yet these are precisely the employees who
are most likely to have performance standards that are difficult to quantify
and hence suffer from discharge decisions that are difficult to defend to
outside decisionmakers.
Perhaps the most baffling aspect of the debate over the legal regulation
of employment in general is the apparent willingness of so many advocates
of employees' interests to trust the state. At the Symposium at which these
papers were discussed there was some discussion of when the "golden age"
of labor and employment law (during which the state championed the
interests of employees) existed. There never was a "golden age" of labor
and employment law in this sense because there has never been a time
when the state sided with employees.10 3 The state does not side with the
powerless and the weak but with the powerful. Allocating disputes to state
dispute resolution mechanisms to be decided according to state-mandated
rules would inevitably lead to worse conditions for employees.
103. I am sure I differ with many of the other Symposium participants on the issue of whether the
state ought to intervene on behalf of employees as a group even if it were so inclined. Neutrality of
the entity which holds a legal monopoly on the use of force strikes me as the only fair allocation of that
monopoly, since once that monopoly has been deployed on behalf of any interest, that interest is no
longer weak and powerless by definition but capable of doing great harm to others.
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When considering allocating disputes to the courts, we should begin
with the simple proposition that using the courts is costly. Courts are
costly not merely because judges, court reporters, and especially lawyers
all expect to be paid, but also because proving something to an outside
decisionmaker requires verifiable, not merely observable, information.
The cost of verifiable information is not simply that employers must pay
foi lawyers; it is that employers will alter their employment relationships
to make performance a matter which can be evaluated on the basis of
verifiable information. Those changes will reduce the level of performance
the employers ask of their employees, and both employers and employees
will be worse off.
Would-be reformers must also consider the imperfection of human
institutions. Any just-cause regime, whether a haphazard affair like the
current common-law regimes or a more comprehensive statutory one like
Montana's," neglects to consider that employers cannot be forced to be
good employers simply by ordering them to be good employers. 5 This
expresses itself in two ways. First, attempting to command behavior by
employers (or employees) will often be unsuccessful, for the employer (or
employee) whose behavior is affected will simply shift his attention to a
different margin of activity. As there is no guarantee that the parties (or
any particular party) will be left better off at the end of the process of
adjustment, proponents of radical change ought to be under some obligation
to produce evidence to support their claims. Courts are particularly ill-
suited as forums for collecting and evaluating such evidence. Consider the
difference between the factual record supporting Title VII and that
supporting the judicial erosion of employment-at-will.
Second, to the extent the attempt to command has an impact, such
attempts at command and control regulation of the labor market will lead
to distortions of both the labor market and of the legal system. Markets
require winners and losers to operate. As Adam Smith noted, it is not due
to the benevolence of the butcher that we expect our beef, but to his self-
interest in selling us meat."° More precisely, it is because if the butcher
does not offer us meat of acceptable quality at the market price, then we
will not buy from him, and he will lose his investment in his inventory,
shop, and tools and be reduced to a pauper. When a butcher does offer
meat of substandard quality or service of an unreliable nature, in a market
104. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1995).
.105. Similarly, employees cannot be forced by the state (or anyone else) to be "good" employees,
as the experience of the former East Bloc countries showed. The old Soviet proverb that "they pretend
that they pay us and we pretend that we work for them" illustrates the foolishness of attempting to
command behavior by either employers or employees. Dimitri K. Simes, Fist That Held Hammer and
Sickle Is Now an Open Palm, NEWSDAY, June 30, 1991, at 36.
106. ADAM SMmTH, I AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
21-22 (London, 8th ed. 1796) (1776).
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economy he does indeed lose his investment-if he did not, the incentive
to make us an attractive bargain would be greatly reduced. The savings
and loan industry in the 1980s is a classic example of the consequences of
freeing market participants of the consequences of their choices.
Similarly, functioning labor markets require that people who make bad
choices suffer the consequences of those choices. Employers must bear the
risk that bad employment practices will make them unpopular with
employees, 1°7 while employees must bear the risk that they have chosen
their employer poorly. Failing to allocate these risks properly will
guarantee that labor markets fail. 10
An even more pernicious influence of wrongful discharge remedies is
their corrosive effect on the union sector. One of the original impetuses
for the adoption of wrongful discharge remedies was the perceived
"unfairness" of nonunion employees' lack of protection from discharge
when compared to union-sector employees' protection through their union
contracts. Not only do the legal remedies reduce the incentive to join
unions, their growing extension to union members is reducing employers'
willingness to accept unions. If union contracts are allowed to be
subverted in this fashion not only will employees' incentives to join unions
be reduced (something to which most critics of the at-will rule would be
opposed), but firms' incentives to accept union contracts as the price of
107. Consider the case of an employer in an at-will state and an employer in a state with some
form of mandated just-cause protection. In the at-will state, the employer must compete for employees
in the marketplace. One way to do so is to offer attractive terms of employment, and to the extent"
employees prefer employment security, the employer will do so. If all employers are mandated to offer
identical employment-security arrangements, however, employers will no longer be able to differentiate
themselves. Some employers clearly do attempt to differentiate themselves to prospective employees
on this ground. Employees will be left to choose between jobs with less information-thrown back
precisely on the mechanisms like reputation and social networks so scorned by critics of the at-will rule.
Not only will employees still rely on these same institutions for information about jobs, but they
will do so in an environment in which there is less incentive to develop such networks and less
information for the networks to disseminate. Without the relatively clearcut issue of job security,
employers will be distinguished more by more subtle and difficult to differentiate aspects such as the
quality of the health plan offered (comparing an HMO with a PPO, let alone with a traditional
insurance plan, is difficult) or the subjective reports of treatment by superiors.
108. Inducing such failures as an excuse for additional government intervention is a classic strategy
for increasing state control. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRnICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OFAMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987). In addition, to the extent that existing labor market im-
perfections have resulted in successful rent-seeking behavior, creation of job security for those holding
jobs with high rents-precisely the effect of the common-law remedies-increases the incentive for such
behavior by preserving the successful rent-seekers and rents. See Katz & Summers, supra note 29, at
257-60, 269 (discussing interindustry wage differentials resulting from rent-seeking behavior).
Restrictions on discharge can also hinder the search process through which employers and
employees learn about each other and determine if a good match exists. Analyzing data from the 1960s
and 1970s, a period of virtually complete at-will employment in the nonunion sector, economist Robert
Hall found evidence that most job changes occur before the fifth year of employment. Hall, supra note
40, at 720. Restricting at-will discharges to six months as some courts have done and some critics have
advocated would significantly hamper this process.
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labor peace would be reduced. After all, why expose yourself to
arbitration over discipline and discharge if it will not buy you freedom
from common-law tort liability for wrongful discharge claims?
Finally, the remedies distort the legal system. Because the common-
law remedies grew out of the actions of the worst employers, the remedies
and sanctions have developed in response to the behavior of an unrepresen-
tative sample of employers."9 These remedies are often overly generous,
prompting otherwise marginal claims to be brought. 10
During the past quarter century courts have revolutionized the law
governing employment. This revolution was the product of a flawed
analysis of the incidence of "bad" discharges, a persistent underestimation
of the strength of market forces, and an equally persistent faith in the
benevolence and efficacy of government. This revolution has not been
built on a serious analysis of data or even a serious attempt to collect data.
It was built on a foundation of anecdotes. It is time to admit this was a
mistake and abandon wrongful discharge law.
There is a price for mandating legal job security, and it is a price
which ought to concern even those who do not share my concern for
freedom of contract. Jerry Greenfield ought to be able to fire an employee
for "making shitty ice cream" and he ought to be able to fire an employee
for "being a shitty person." If he does, he ought to be answerable to his
conscience and his shareholders, not to a court. He ought to be able to do
these things not because he is a smart person or because he has politically
correct values but because he is an employer and that is how markets
separate good employers from bad employers.
As Professor Heriot notes, "We can attempt to purchase greater job
security for our employee citizens, but we must not pretend for a moment
that we are unaware of the price that is being paid or of the currency in
which it is being paid.""' The burden rests upon the advocates of change
to demonstrate positive evidence to justify remaking the U.S. economy in
the image of the post office. So far they have proved only that courts are
indeed bad places to make social policy.
109. Even if the courts have correctly designed the remedies for these employers, other employers
will be deterred from appropriate action because the sanctions will be too severe. See Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Sanctions, Uninformed Individuals and Acquisitions, Information about the Law (Discussion
Paper No. 62, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School) (July 1989) (discussing the
problem of severe sanctions deterring legal as well as illegal conduct).
110. A clear example of this is the development of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in Montana. Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws --Lessons from
One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 359, 430-42 (1995).
111. Heriot, supra note 92, at 222.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I set out a simple model which illustrates the
observable/verifiable distinction discussed in subpart II(C).
Assume effort (e) is a continuous variable which lies in [0, 00] and is
not directly observable. Output (y) is effort plus noise (e), so that
y = e + e, where E is distributed uniformly between -x and x and
E(e) = 0. Further assume that employers can observe only whether the
employee's performance passes or fails an output test, i.e., whether y > y
or y < y, where y is the test standard." This binary observation is not
unrealistic: it suggests employees are monitored by whether they meet a
standard of performance."' If employees meet the standard (pass) they
keep their jobs; if they fall below it (fail) they are fired. 114  While
employers can observe the pass-fail result costlessly, it is costly to prove
the result to an outsider if they are required by legal rules to do so.
Moreover, the cost of proof depends on the standard by which employees
are measured. The cost of proof is represented by the function c(U), which
for convenience I assume has the form c(y) = cy." 5 Employers pay the
112. This observation will be determined by the employer's choice of monitoring technology. For
my purposes I need not consider whether observation is costly and so will assume firms incur no cost
in observing an employee's effort.
113. Difficulties in measuring output where employees work in teams or where the work is
difficult to quantify (an attorney, for example) also suggest this is a reasonable assumption.
114. An employer might care about performance in excess of the standard for other reasons, in
deciding about promotions, for example, but in determining whether to fire the employee the real
question is whether the employee has met the minimum standard or not, not the precise level of the
employee's effort or investment. Since the employer is unable to directly observe y, it cannot offer a
contract w(y), which pays a wage directly linked to observed output (a piece rate).
115. A simple example clarifies the role and properties of c(y). Assume for the purposes of the
example that the support of e and distribution of e are such that y lies in [0,1]. If an employer's
standard is simply thaty > 0, then the employer is partitioning the observed output spectrum into [0]
and [0,1]. Obviously, proving which set the employee's y fell into in this case would not be costly.
(Success in a case like this is not always guaranteed. In Willis v. Lowery, 57 So. 418 (Miss. 1912),
an employee was discharged as a cotton buyer after three months when he failed to purchase any cotton
during that time. The employer claimed that the employee had spent the three months drunk; the
employee claimed that the employer's price was too low. The employee won at the trial level, but the
employer succeeded in getting a new trial.)
Next consider two alternative standards of higher level performance: {[0,0.1), [0.1,1]},
represented by c(0.1), and {[0,0.9), [0.9,1]}, represented by c(0.9). In my model it is costlier to prove
to an outsider whether an employee satisfied the second than it is to prove whether he has satisfied the
first. That is, c(0.9) > c(0.1).
If y simply represented attendance at work, for example, this would not be realistic; it is no
costlier to count ten absences than it is to count two. Output represents something more subtle here.
Consider the manager of a factory with a complex production process. What y measures is the
investment by the factory manager in her performance: Does she devote time each evening to studying
the production process? Does she cultivate a good relationship with employees and suppliers? It is
hard to measure this type of performance, yet it may be critical to getting the plant to operate at
maximum efficiency. It is increasingly difficult to measure high levels of output. For example, it is
relatively easy to prove if the manager takes off every afternoon to play golf, but harder to prove she
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cost of proof" 6 when they see the employee's output. 117
Assume further that employees are risk neutral, receive utility from
wages (w), and experience disutility of effort according to a function g(e),
where g'(e) and g"(e) are both positive. The probability of an exogenous
job change (due to spouse relocation, for example) is b. The discount rate
is r. Both are constant. Even a hard-working employee may be
discharged for "slacking" if the employee gets a bad e. Since output is
effort plus noise, the probability of discharge for "slacking" is F(y - e).
Letting Vu be the lifetime utility of a currently unemployed person and
wages be w, the optimal level of effort (e") that the employee will
could have had better suggestions for improving the plant if she had spent more time studying up at
home.
The golf example is not unrealistic. In one Alabama case, a salesman who had been employed
by the defendant for 18 years was fired for "being at the golf course in violation of a previous
directive." Kitsos v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 431 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Ala. 1983); see also Bauer v.
American Freight Sys., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 435, 437 (S.D. 1988) (noting that the employee admitted
to having spent an "inordinate" amount of time at a pool hall during working hours and was observed
there in a company car approximately 30 times during an eight-week period); Haag v. Revell, 184 P.2d
442, 443 (Wash. 1947 ) (observing that "[t]here is quite persuasive evidence that [the employee] spent
a great deal of time in a nearby coffee house which should have been spent in pruning the orchards").
116. For convenience, I assume that the less thorough documentation of employees who will not
be fired is costless. Alternatively, one might view c(y) as the incremental cost over that which an
employer would incur under an at-will regime. There may also be some ex ante cost to monitoring-an
initial investment in monitoring technology or the like. These costs are not the focus of my model,
however, and are assumed away.
117. For example, when an employer observes y < y, it might send the employee's file to its
attorney, who reviews it for potential liability if the employee is fired and recommends further steps.
Expenditures on proof need not affect what the employer knows about performance, only what it can
prove. This assumption simply means that employers document cases in which they plan to fire the
employee more thoroughly than cases in which they do not. Although they observe the performance
of those they will not fire (which is how they decide whom to fire), they do not document as thoroughly
the performance of employees who perform adequately since such an expenditure would serve no
purpose. Many employers conduct regular performance appraisals. These appraisals are often used
for many purposes, however, such as building morale or signaling that the employer is watching.
Thus, it is not uncommon for employers to find that even an employee whom it plans to fire has had
a long string of satisfactory performance appraisals, nor is it uncommon to have to take special steps
to document performance more accurately after deciding to fire an employee. See STUART H. BOMPEY
ET AL., WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: A PREVENTiVE APPROACH 348-49 (2d ed. 1991) (warning
of pitfalls in employer evaluations). Even a record of poor evaluations may be challenged by an
employee as insufficient cause for dismissal. See Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377,
379 (N.J. 1988) (employee claimed his poor performance evaluations were the result of a Japanese
business practice of setting performance goals at unattainable levels to motivate employees to excel).
1938
1996] Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law 1939
choose,"' given the values of w and y chosen by the employer, is
defined by the first-order condition:
(e) - [w- g(e) - rV ] [F(y- 
e)]
r + b + F(y - e)
according to the value of a parameter, fi, which is high when e has a large
impact and small where e is less important." 9 Although there is a wide
range of possible legal rules" ° governing the standard for discharge, for
the model's purposes we can reduce these to two: the at-will rule' and
the just-cause rule."
The first-order condition" for the employee's problem provides the
118. An asset equation for an employed person who supplies effort e can be written as
rV, - w- g(e) + [b + F(y - e)] (V - V)
where VE is the lifetime utility of a currently employed person.
Employees thus solve
w- g(e) + [b + F(y- e)]V.maxe r + b + F(y- e)
119. The model's use of a single fi is an oversimplification in this regard. Clearly employers
actually face a variety of production techniques which use different proportions of different "fl-types"
of employees. Introducing these complications here would only muddy the results without capturing
any additional effects of interest.
120. To list just a few, consider the opinions of Judge Reinhardt and Judge Kozinski in Sanders
v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991). Reinhardt
advocates requiring a company to prove an event took place to rely on it as the justification for dis-
charging an employee. Id. at 196-97 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Kozinski argues that all that is re-
quired is a good-faith belief that the event occurred. Id. at 205, 209 n.7 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Consider also the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
904(2) (1995) (requiring the employer to show "good cause" for firing an employee after completion
of the "employer's probationary period of employment"); THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
Acr, 7A U.L.A. 71, 73 (Supp. 1995) (granting covered employees "an expanded substantive right to
'good cause' protections against discharge"); and the union-sector just-cause nile present in most collec-
tive bargaining agreements. See Peck, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that 80% of collective bargaining
agreements contain cause or just-cause provisions).
121. Under the at-will rule, the revenue function is
R(L) - Lpe - AL? - wL.
Expanding labor use requires additional supervision, and this is reflected by the second term in the
firms' revenue function.
122. Under the just-cause rule, the revenue function is
R(L) - Lpe - A 2 - wL - Lcj.
123. Note that the first-order condition for this problem is not sufficient to characterize the
employee's choice of an optimal e; where 5 - e'(w,y) = ± x, the employee's optimal e is zero.
(Increasing y above e+x will not raise effort since the employee will be fired anyway as F(y-
e) =F(x)= 1. If y is lowered below e-x, the employee will have no incentive to work hard because he
will not be fired as F(y-e)=F(-x)=0.)
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solution 24
e - 2xr + 2xb + + x - /(2xr + 2xb + + x) - 2(w- VU)
The value of y is such that the employee chooses the maximum effort
where
Y - e* (w,-y) - x.
Writing in terms of parameters and w, denoted as '(w): 12
Y*(w) - y/(2Xr + 2xb + 2x) 2 + 2(w- rVU) - 2xr - 2xb - x.
The firm's problem is thus to choose employment (L) and wages (w) to
maximize profits.'" Solving for the values of e, y, w, and L under each
To make the problem solvable, I assume g(e) = '/e 2 . The employee's choice of effort level can
now be written as




124. The first-order condition gives a quadratic expression for e; the negative root is the
appropriate solution. By examination, we see that the positive root is outside the range where
F(y - e) = [ye + x]12x since
2xr+ 2xb+ +x+ (2xr+ 2xb+jY+x) 2 - 2(w- ZV U) > +x.
Turning to the negative root, if y - x > e, then it too would be outside the proper range for F(y - e).
Checking the values from Table 1 for this condition shows that both the at-will and just-cause solutions
satisfy this requirement.
125. 9 must also be at least [(2xr+2xb)2 + 2(w-rV)] '-2xr-2xb-x to motivate the employee.
126. Under the at-will rule the firm's problem will be
max,*L Lpe - ALZ - Lw.
2
Defining K as [2xr + 2xb + 9] and substituting, the first order conditions under the at-will rule are
L: (k + x) 2 + 2(W- rVU)] - (k + x) -L- W- 0
and
w: P[(k+ x) 2 +2(w-V)] 1 0.
Under a just-cause nile the firm's problem will be
maxwL Lpe - -ILT - LW - cyL.
2
The first-order conditions will then be
L: (P - C) ((2xr + 2xb + 2x)
2 
+ 2(w- rVU)] 2
- 0(2xr + 2xb + 2x) - w- L + ck - 0
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rule gives the values in Table 6. Effort and the firing rule are lower under
the just-cause rule, while the sign of the difference in employment levels
depends upon parameter values due to the presence of the efficiency wage
effect identified by David I. Levine.'" Denoting the values of e, y, w,
and L under the at-will and just-cause rules respectively with subscript as
and js and comparing social welfare under the two rules, the at-will rule
will be more efficient when
La(Iea - -e) > Lj([ej - - c)
Substituting and canceling terms, this yields an unwieldy inequality" s
which shows that for values of fl sufficiently large, 29 the inefficiencies
associated with the just-cause rule increase withf.'30
Table 6: Model Results
At-Will Just-Cause
e f -2rx -2bx -2x f -2rx -2bx -2x -c
y 8 - 2rx - 2bx - 2x fi - 2rx - 2bx - x - c
1/2fl2. -(2rx+2bx+2x) 2  h(fl-c)
2 - h(2rx+2bx+2x)2W + rVU + rVu
1A(fJ.-C) 2 + ',(2rx+2bx+2x) 2
L ,af + 'A(2rx+2bx+2x)2  - rVu -f(2rx+2bx+2x)
-:rVu -ft(2rx+2bx+2x) + c(2rx+2bx+x)
-c
[(2xr + 2xb + 2x) 2 + 2(w rV)]Pt
-1- 0.
127. See Levine, supra note 78, at 902-05.
128. Reducing to parameter terms, this inequality is:
-L (2rx + 2bx + x + c)
2
P2 (! - 4X 2 (3r + 3b + 2 + 4rb + 2b 2 + 2r
2
) - 3xc(r + b + -))
+ 1 (I (2xz+2xb+2x) - 3x 3 (r+b+1) _ rV. (2rx+2bx+2x) -xc (c-2xr-2xb- Ix)
22 2
+ c(2xr+2xb+x) (X2+c- +2cx+- ! (2xr+2xb+3x+c) (2xr+2xb+x)) > 0.
2 2
129. That is, fls large enough to allow the cubed term to dominate the expression.
130. The at-will rule is not more efficient in all cases because of the Levine efficiency wage
effects. Levine, supra note 78, at 902.
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